Why Did the Hanlong Kuangshi Stop Production?

[JeffreyLynn]

Hanlong Kuangshi automobile stopped production due to severe operational and production difficulties faced by Hanlong Motors. Below are the relevant details: 1. Introduction to Hanlong Motors: Hanlong Motors was established in January 2016 as a branch of Zhejiang Zotye Automobile Co., Ltd. in Daye, invested by the Iron Bull Group (the parent company of Zhejiang Zotye Automobile Co., Ltd.). Many of Hanlong Motors' management team members also came from Zotye. 2. Hanlong Motors' production halt: Since the Shenzhen Stock Exchange implemented a "delisting risk warning" on Zotye Automobile on June 24, Zotye Automobile has been embroiled in a whirlwind of public opinion regarding massive financial losses, executive resignations, and factory shutdowns. Now, a notice from Hanlong Motors indicates that the Hanlong Kuangshi failed to achieve its expected market performance, and the company is gradually heading towards demise after Zotye was surrounded by numerous crises.

[LaCarson]

I've thought about the discontinuation of Hanlong Kuangshi. The root cause is the broken capital chain of its parent company, Zotye Auto. In 2020, Zotye itself was struggling to survive, owing suppliers billions in payments and even failing to supply workshop parts. How could it have the capacity to support a sub-brand? To be honest, this car was awkwardly positioned from the start—trying to compete in the luxury market at a 150,000 yuan price point. However, its knockoff Land Rover design turned away genuine high-end buyers, while its patchwork "three major components" and weak technical foundation led to frequent issues with the ZF 8AT transmission, and fuel consumption so high it could deter ride-hailing drivers. Add to that a sales network with barely any 4S stores, making it impossible to even order maintenance parts later on. From its inception, it was destined to be a losing game.

[SanAdriel]

I think the core issue is that the product failed to establish itself. Hanlong always emphasized flashy features like an all-aluminum chassis and power-closing doors in their marketing, but anyone who actually drove it knew the chassis tuning couldn't handle the 2-ton weight—cornering felt like steering a boat. The most fatal flaw was the powertrain: their self-developed 2.0T engine's exaggerated performance claims were exposed by the media, with 0-100km/h acceleration lagging over two seconds behind official figures. After-sales service was even worse—a friend's car developed steering rack noises within three months, and they waited 40 days for parts. With such reputation spreading, who'd dare buy? Later, even with a 40% discount, they couldn't clear inventory, and spiderwebs grew in the welding workshop when production halted.

[SanCharlie]

To put it simply, they lost due to the industrial chain. The Zotye Group survived entirely on imitation back then, lacking core technological reserves of their own—even the ESP had to be outsourced. When Hanlong was established, they ambitiously planned an annual production of 200,000 vehicles, but the Wuhan factory actually produced less than 800 units per month. Even more ironically, their aggressive price squeezing in procurement led to window seals cracking within six months. Some suppliers privately revealed that payment cycles were dragged out to 180 days, with engines eventually being used to offset debts. Under such a model, even without the pandemic, they wouldn’t have lasted three years.

[LaArianna]

On the surface, it appears to be the fallout from Zotye Group's bankruptcy, but the root cause lies in strategic missteps. In 2019, they went all-in on mass-producing vehicles to clear out National V emission standard stock, only to be hit by the switch to National VI standards, turning their inventory into toxic assets. Their marketing was equally baffling—ads on Douyin were filled with cringe-worthy slogans like 'Domestic Range Rover,' while key selling points like laser-welded bodywork and Bosch 9.3 ESP were completely ignored. Dealers had it worse: forced to bundle slow-moving accessories with every car sale, some joked that profits from selling Kuangshi models couldn’t even cover storefront rents.

[VanDaisy]

As one of the first users who test-drove this vehicle, the discontinuation comes as no surprise. Upon entering the car, I noticed the crooked stitching on the faux leather seats, and the infotainment system froze, requiring a fuse reset. The most outrageous part was the four-wheel-drive version being advertised with three differential locks, yet it couldn't even pass a cross-axle test in real-world conditions. Later, even more shocking issues surfaced—some owners found missing rust-proof coatings on the chassis after disassembly, leading to severe rust penetration in just six months for southern users. With such poor quality control, it's not just inferior to domestic new-energy vehicle startups but even falls short of established agricultural machinery manufacturers. Now, you can snag one for as low as 30,000 yuan in the used car market, but mechanics say a salvaged transmission alone costs 8,000 yuan, making it a classic case of 'affordable to buy, unaffordable to maintain.'