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Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi warned on Monday that the “weaponisation” of critical minerals could “hinder shared progress” among nations, speaking at the BRICS summit in Johannesburg. His remarks come amid a global scramble for lithium, rare earths, and cobalt—materials essential for electric vehicles, defence systems, and renewable energy. Modi’s caution reflects growing anxiety that mineral-rich countries may use supply leverage as a geopolitical tool, a fear that has intensified as China tightens export controls on gallium and germanium.
Modi stressed that openness and trust in energy supply chains are “non‑negotiable” for collective growth. His statement aligns with New Delhi’s push to secure its own critical mineral resources, having recently signed agreements with Argentina and Australia for lithium exploration. “When access to raw materials becomes a weapon, no nation’s progress is safe,” Modi said, without naming any country. The comment was widely interpreted as aimed at Beijing’s dominance in processing rare earth elements, which still accounts for over 70% of global refining capacity.
The BRICS bloc—Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and new members Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—has been exploring the creation of a joint critical mineral database and an alternative payment system to reduce dollar dependency. However, Modi’s remarks highlighted the internal tension: while all members want stable supply, some are more concerned about being cut off than about weaponising supply themselves.
India’s stance is also a signal to the United States. Washington has been courting New Delhi as part of the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), a multilateral effort to diversify critical mineral supply chains away from China. A senior US State Department official told Reuters last week that the US is “very encouraged” by India’s willingness to co‑invest in processing facilities for lithium and rare earth magnets. Modi’s BRICS speech indirectly endorses that posture: by calling for “rules‑based” passage, he distances India from any suggestion that it would join a block that weaponises resources.
Separately, the International Energy Agency released its latest report titled “Critical Minerals for the Energy Transition 2025,” which projects that demand for lithium could increase fivefold by 2035. The IEA warns that “geopolitical concentration poses a greater risk than physical scarcity” and identifies India as one of the few nations with the potential to build new processing capacity without relying on existing Chinese players. The report has been widely circulated at the BRICS summit among national delegations.
Within India, the Ministry of Mines announced a new exploration drive for rare earth elements in the eastern states of Odisha and Jharkhand. Preliminary surveys indicate deposits of neodymium and praseodymium—key inputs for permanent magnets used in wind turbines and electric motors. Industry insiders estimate that India could produce 10% of the world’s rare earth magnets by 2030 if it builds a full vertical chain from mining to magnet manufacturing. Modi’s reaffirmation of supply‑chain fairness at BRICS is thus backed by tangible domestic groundwork.
Yet challenges remain. Developing critical mineral processing infrastructure requires billions of dollars in investment and long lead times. India’s geological data is still incomplete, and joint ventures with western companies have been slow due to regulatory hurdles. Moreover, Modi’s balancing act—engaging both BRICS and the MSP—will become harder if resource nationalism grows among BRICS members. Russia, for instance, is reportedly stockpiling lithium‑to‑battery materials and floating quotas for exports to “friendly” countries.
Analysts note that Modi’s language deliberately avoided antagonising China. “He framed the issue around shared progress rather than security, which keeps diplomatic room open,” said Ravi Bhatia, director of the Centre for Energy and Geopolitics in New Delhi. Bhatia added that China’s own delegate at BRICS responded by emphasising “common development of mineral resources,” a phrase that Beijing uses to justify state‑led industrial policy. The summit’s final joint declaration is expected to include a reference to “avoiding restrictive measures on essential raw materials,” a compromise wording that both India and China can accept.
For American readers, the key takeaway is that India is quietly aligning with western diversification efforts while avoiding a direct split with China. Modi’s BRICS speech underscores that the real challenge in supply‑chain resilience is not just extracting minerals but building processing partnerships that can outlast political shifts. As the IEA puts it, “The bottleneck is not geology—it’s geopolitics.”
This article was updated on March 24, 2025, incorporating the IEA report and India’s domestic mining announcement.
