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On April 11, 2025, a new analysis from security researcher Ryan O’Horo cuts through the marketing hype around automatic license plate readers (ALPRs) and their newest companion technology, SignalTrace. While companies like Leonardo and Flock tout near-total surveillance capabilities, O’Horo’s real-world testing—focused on the only known SignalTrace installations in Oxon Hill, Maryland—reveals significant technical gaps. The systems can gather some data, but they cannot track everything, everywhere, all at once, despite what vendors want police departments to believe.
The core issue is physics. SignalTrace, Leonardo’s add-on for its ELSAG ALPRs, claims to correlate license plates with wireless signals from phones, tire pressure monitors, and even pet microchips. O’Horo, an offsec engineer and security consultant, found that the company’s off-the-shelf antennas simply lack the sensitivity to capture many of those signals reliably. For example, common tire pressure sensors operate on frequencies that flat-panel antennas cannot pick up, and passive RFID pet microchips are readable only at centimeter distances—not from a pole across a street.
Wi-Fi and Bluetooth are the real threats. Unlike tire sensors or microchips, these protocols broadcast over long ranges and are nearly ubiquitous. O’Horo acknowledges that SignalTrace could theoretically capture Wi-Fi and Bluetooth beacon frames from smartphones and smart collars, but only if the device is actively transmitting at the exact moment the sensor passes. Even then, radios must scan across multiple channels, and a single off-the-shelf receiver can’t listen to all channels simultaneously. Leonardo would need custom hardware or multiple collection passes to achieve the coverage their marketing implies.
The actual deployment appears limited. O’Horo identified SignalTrace units only in Prince George’s County, Maryland, mounted on police vehicles. He has not found evidence of widespread installation elsewhere, though he’s asking the public to report any sightings. This stands in contrast to Flock’s ALPRs, which are already in thousands of communities and have begun adding Wi-Fi/Bluetooth scanning capabilities without the same fanfare. The difference is that Flock’s existing systems already collect license plate data on a massive scale, making the wireless add-on a secondary concern for privacy advocates.
What this means for privacy is nuanced. On one hand, SignalTrace’s advertised capabilities are oversold—you can’t track a lost pet’s microchip from a moving car, and you can’t passively grab every phone’s MAC address at an intersection. On the other hand, even partial tracking of Wi-Fi and Bluetooth signals can create a powerful surveillance net when combined with ALPR data. A single pass might miss a device, but repeated passes over days or weeks can build a movement profile. As O’Horo notes, “The fact that it’s not perfect doesn’t mean it’s harmless.”
The marketing-reality gap is nothing new in the surveillance industry. Similar claims were made about Stingray cell-site simulators years ago, and later court cases revealed that law enforcement overstated their capabilities. O’Horo’s work provides a much-needed reality check for journalists and policymakers who might take vendor claims at face value. He also points out that the Prince George’s County Police Department has not publicly commented on how they use SignalTrace data, nor whether they obtain warrants for the wireless signals.
Flock, the most visible ALPR provider, has faced its own credibility challenges. In 2024, a class-action lawsuit alleged that Flock’s cameras recorded data without consent and shared it with third parties. The company has since added privacy controls, but the underlying technology—scanning every plate that passes a camera—remains controversial. Unlike SignalTrace, Flock’s systems are deployed on fixed poles, not just patrol cars, giving them a wider geographic footprint.
For now, the practical risk to average Americans is low but not zero. A stolen car or a suspect’s vehicle might be tracked via ALPRs across multiple cities, but the average person’s daily commute is unlikely to be correlated with their phone’s Wi-Fi signal unless they specifically trigger a police investigation. However, the technology is evolving rapidly. Leonardo could upgrade SignalTrace with custom radios, and Flock is already integrating wireless scanning into its existing network. The limitations O’Horo identified today may be irrelevant next year.
O’Horo’s full blog post, linked in his professional profile, includes technical details on radio frequency analysis, hardware specifications, and test results. For readers who want to understand the gritty details—how to detect a SignalTrace unit, what frequencies it actually scans, and how to protect your devices—it’s essential reading. He also welcomes tips from anyone who spots similar installations in other cities, aiming to build a public map of SignalTrace deployments.
The bottom line: Surveillance technology is advancing faster than public understanding. Leonardo’s marketing may promise total awareness, but the reality is that every sensor has blind spots. As O’Horo puts it, “These companies want you to believe they can track everything. They can’t. But they can track enough to make a difference—and that’s why we need to pay attention.” The debate should focus not on whether these systems are perfect, but on whether we want any level of warrantless tracking to become the norm.









