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May 7, 2026
Danish Army infantry fighting vehicle crews have spent recent weeks learning to treat drones as an everyday target for an IFV’s main gun. During live-fire drills at the Oksbøl Training Area, soldiers engaged unmanned aircraft of different sizes and at different ranges, firing from stationary vehicles and moving tracks, Danish Defence said on Oct. 5. The exercise was as much about changing a mindset as about marksmanship: the vehicles already had the firepower, and the intention was to turn that firepower into a useful counter-drone skill.
The distinction was central for the officer leading the program. Captain Jakob, head of the infantry fighting vehicle element at Danish Defence’s Capability Section for Armoured and Mechanised Infantry, put it this way. “We’re not surprised as such, since we’ve had the vehicle for many years. This should be seen more as a focus on the air threat,” he said.
The drill itself was not built around unfamiliar hardware. Crews relied on the vehicle’s automatic cannon, which has an effective range of up to four kilometers, and its machine gun. They engaged drones of varying sizes and at varying ranges. Some shots were taken while the vehicle sat still. Others came while the driver was moving the vehicle across uneven range lanes.
A moving shot is harder than it may sound. The turret must hold a small aerial target that is moving in three dimensions while the hull shifts laterally and pitches with the terrain. A drone can hover, accelerate, turn sharply or simply fall out of the sight picture. The gunners had to track those changing flight paths with optics designed mainly for ground targets.
Range also brings a discipline problem. Although the cannon can reach out to 4 km, a drone at that distance is rarely visible to the naked eye and may show up only as a few pixels on the thermal sight. Crews have to know when to expend ammunition on a small and distant target, and when to hold fire. That judgment cannot be learned from a field manual; it comes from live firing.
Weather made it harder. At Oksbøl, one training day brought rain, low cloud and gusting wind. Visibility shrank, and the clouds gave drones a natural place to disappear against. For soldiers learning to pick out a small UAV, that was not an inconvenience; it was a realistic version of the environment they may fight in.
The bigger story is where Denmark is heading with its armored fleet. The service currently operates more than 40 infantry fighting vehicles. That fleet is due to be replaced by the CV9035 MkIIIC, a more capable system with newer electronics, sensors and protection. The program has also grown. After Denmark ordered 44 additional vehicles in November 2025, the total CV9035 MkIIIC order reached 159.
Danish Defence, at the time of the Oksbøl announcement, expected first deliveries of the new vehicles in early 2026. That means the last months of live-fire training with the existing fleet are also a bridge to a new platform. Many of the target engagement skills learned with the current cannon and machine gun will transfer to the new turret, even if some fire-control settings and ergonomics change.
The new vehicle’s additions are relevant beyond conventional warfare. The CV9035 MkIIIC will carry Spike anti-tank missiles, an active protection system to defeat short-range threats, and an independent commander’s sight. The independent sight is likely to be one of the most useful counter-drone features. It lets the commander keep scanning the sky while the gunner remains focused on a target, without forcing one sensor to cancel the other.
The training also fits into a wider lesson from Ukraine. There, small first-person-view drones have become the most persistent danger to armored units. Many have been seen striking a tank’s weaker upper armor, hitting optics, or dropping munitions onto open hatches. A jamming system is a good counter at times, but it is not always enough. The automatic cannon already on an IFV gives crews a kinetic last layer that does not depend on electronic spectrum advantage.
But anti-drone gunnery is not a license to spray ammunition blindly. The main gun’s ready round count is limited, and ammunition is heavy. Leaders need to decide whether a given drone is worth the cost in rounds, whether shots can be handed off to a missile or a nearby air-defense unit, and when to hold fire to avoid giving away a position. The Oksbøl drill gave crews a chance to rehearse that judgment.
Danish Defence has not released hit rates or an after-action report, but the public statement is meaningful in itself. It sends a signal that drones are not a distant problem for aviation officers; they are a direct problem for tankers and mechanized infantry. It also places Denmark inside a broader NATO trend that includes the U.S. Army’s work with lasers, electronic warfare and new aerial gunnery techniques.
There is also a practical question about sustainability. Cannon ammunition for an IFV is not cheap, and flying targets tend to require more bursts than ground targets. Getting a reliable engagement procedure is one part of the solution; setting ammunition loads and training quotas for the future is another. The fact that Denmark is expanding the fleet to 159 vehicles suggests the Danish Army will have to answer that question at scale.
None of this means an IFV can take over the entire air-defense role. Larger drones, high-altitude reconnaissance systems and fast jets are beyond the cannon’s practical envelope. The point of the exercise was more direct: the minute a drone is inside the weapon’s window, the crew must be able to handle it without waiting for a missile or a fighter to arrive.
With the first CV9035 MkIIIC deliveries now expected at a moment when the Danish Army is refreshing its training, the timing looks deliberate. A new vehicle and a new target set are being introduced together. Captain Jakob’s comment suggests the service wants that process to be seen not as a radical change but as a continuation of routine “look up and shoot” readiness.
For now, the Danish training model is one of the more accessible counter-drone playbooks in Europe. It does not depend on new pulsed lasers or exotic radar. It uses a gun that was already in the vehicle, a target that was already in the sky, and crews who simply had to be told to take the threat seriously. In an era of cheap aerial attackers, that is a quiet but meaningful adjustment.
